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Research Report · Center for Media Research – Nepal

Responding to Electoral Misinformation

Policy Approaches and Practices During the 2026 Nepal Election

ISBN
---
DOI
10.62657/cmr26rrb
Part of
Researching Asian Information Disorder and Responses (RAIDAR)
Funded by
The Asia Foundation
Contents

1. Introduction

Nepal held its latest parliamentary election on March 5, 2026. The election took place during a period of political transition following the Gen Z movement of September 2025. It was also a time when the information environment was becoming increasingly digital and public trust in established political institutions was declining. The Gen Z movement was largely mobilized through digital platforms and was followed by the resignation of the prime minister, the formation of an interim government, and the dissolution of the House of Representatives (Moshiri, 2026). The interim government was mandated to hold elections. During this political upheaval, social media platforms had become spaces for political discussion, action and mobilization rather than merely channels of communication. The platforms not only shaped public narratives but also carried and amplified misinformation on a scale not previously observed in Nepal’s history.

The significance of this shift is not only that more Nepalis have access to information, but also that social media platforms have increasingly become important sources of news and political information, particularly for younger audiences. The information encountered on these platforms appears alongside political campaigning, commentary, personal posts, entertainment and algorithmically recommended content. This has changed the way political information reaches voters and has made the distinction between political communication, partisan advocacy and misleading information more difficult to maintain.

Election-related information disorder is not a new challenge in Nepal. The 2022 general election showed that misleading information could circulate during the electoral process and that responses required coordination among electoral authorities, social media platforms, civil society, media and fact-checkers (Shrestha, 2022; NDI et al., 2023). However, the 2026 election took place in a different technological and political environment. The increased use of short-form video, the growing importance of social media in news consumption, coordinated digital campaigning and the emergence of AI-generated content created new challenges for institutions responsible for electoral integrity (Adhikari, 2026; Bhatta, 2026; The Kathmandu Post, 2026).

Existing research on Nepal has documented misinformation incidents, the role of social media in political mobilization and the legal and regulatory environment governing online communication. CMR-Nepal’s work during the 2017 and 2022 elections has provided an empirical basis for understanding the actors, sources, and effects of election-related misinformation. However, less attention has been given to how the different actors responsible for electoral information integrity operate as part of the same information environment. In particular, there is limited systematic analysis of the relationship between the Election Commission of Nepal (ECN), political parties, social media platforms, civil society, media, and fact-checking organizations.

This study therefore examines how key stakeholders, including the ECN, political parties, social media platforms, civil society organizations, and media, understood and responded to election-related information disorder during Nepal’s 2026 election. It analyses the policies, operations and interventions by these stakeholders: what mechanisms and commitments were in place, how they operated during the electoral cycle, and what gaps affected their effectiveness. The study builds on the experience of the 2022 election while generating new findings from documentary research, monitoring of public interventions, and key informant interviews. CMR-Nepal’s previous research works on misinformation provided a foundation for the study, but the 2026 research was conducted independently and its findings are based on evidence collected during the study period.

The study treats information integrity as a component of free, fair, and safe elections. Election-related information disorder is understood not simply as a problem of false or misleading content, but as a wider information-integrity and governance challenge involving institutional capacity, coordination among relevant stakeholders, the role of digital platforms, public access to reliable information, and the ability of electoral institutions and citizens to respond to information pollution (UNDP, 2024).

The research examines how state institutions, social media platforms, civil society, media, and fact-checkers understood and responded to election-related information disorder during Nepal’s 2026 election, with attention to the effectiveness, coordination, and gaps in their responses.

The study also examines political parties as an important and comparatively underexamined actor in the electoral information environment. It considers their digital campaigning practices, the organization of online teams and the transparency of political advertising, while distinguishing legitimate political communication from misinformation and coordinated information manipulation.

The report is organized in such a way that it first presents the research design and methodology. It then provides a concise context and policy review covering Nepal’s digital information environment, the ECN’s institutional response, the 2022 experience, the role of civil society and fact-checkers, and the publicly available approaches of platforms and political parties. The Findings section examines practices during the 2026 electoral cycle. It then identifies the major cross-cutting gaps, followed by conclusions and recommendations.

2. Research Design and Methodology

2.1 Research objectives

This research examines how key actors responded to election-related misinformation during Nepal’s 2026 election. More specifically, it:

  • documents how state institutions, including the ECN and law enforcement, acted and collaborated to address misinformation during the election;
  • assesses how major social media platforms responded and implemented their stated election-integrity commitments in the Nepali context;
  • examines the role of political parties and their digital campaigning practices in the electoral information environment; and
  • evaluates the work of civil society organizations, media and fact-checkers in responding to election-related misinformation.

The research is grounded in the premise that election-related information disorder is a political and governance challenge rather than only a technical or informational challenge. It also has a standpoint that responses to information disorder involve power-based multistakeholder approaches, by state institutions, platforms, and civil society. This framing means that the research not only assesses whether interventions were effective but also to whether they were appropriate, rights-based and accountable.

The study produces findings that are policy-relevant and actionable for the relevant actors. It draws out recommendations for improving coordination, transparency, mandate clarity and accountability in future electoral cycles. It also seeks to offer knowledge applicable to comparable small democracies. It also seeks to contribute to understanding of information integrity challenges in smaller democracies.

2.2 Research questions

The research is organized around three questions based on the research objectives:

  1. How did state institutions in Nepal, particularly the ECN, understand and respond to election-related information disorder during the 2026 election, and how effectively did these mechanisms function in practice?
  2. How did major social media platforms implement their election-integrity commitments in Nepal, including through coordination arrangements with state and civil society actors, and to what extent was this implementation transparent, consistent and responsive?
  3. What interventions did civil society organizations, media and fact-checkers implement in responding to election-related misinformation, and how did they assess the effectiveness of their work and their relationships with state and platform actors?

Political parties were examined across these questions as an important actor in the electoral information environment, particularly in relation to digital campaigning, coordinated engagement and political advertising.

2.3 Methodology

The study uses a qualitative research design combining desk research, systematic monitoring and analysis of public interventions, and key informant interviews (KIIs).

2.3.1 Desk research

The desk research involved a systematic review of documentary sources relevant to the legal, regulatory and policy environment governing the 2026 electoral information ecosystem and to the documented history of election-related information disorder in Nepal.

Sources reviewed included Nepal’s electoral laws and amendments, the Electronic Transaction Act 2008, Penal Code provisions applicable to online speech, the ECN’s Social Media Usage Policy and guidances, the Election Code of Conduct for 2026 and documented policy issuances from the ECN during the study period. The research also reviewed relevant literature on information disorder, platform accountability, fact-checking, political campaigning and election integrity.

The study also reviewed public communications from social media platforms, political parties, state institutions, civil society organizations, fact-checkers and media organizations. Where publicly available institutional policies of political parties or platforms could not be identified, the research relied on public communications and observed practices.

2.3.2 Monitoring and analysis of interventions

The research used monitoring of public interventions by all actors during the election period. This was done through the CMR-Nepal’s established monitoring infrastructure and its experience conducting election monitoring during the 2022 cycle.

The monitoring covered public statements, press releases, and official communications from the ECN; platform announcements and policy communications; civil society publications, fact-checks, and public campaigns; political-party public communications; and media reporting on information disorder incidents, enforcement actions, and coordination mechanisms.

The monitoring did not involve content analysis, which was beyond the scope of the study.

2.3.3 Key informant interviews

The primary empirical data for this report were generated through twelve semi-structured key informant interviews conducted between April and June 2026.

Respondents were selected to provide coverage across relevant stakeholders and observers. They were identified on the basis of their direct knowledge of the practices, decisions and challenges of the study topic. The research design did not seek a representative sample but aimed to ensure that each area of inquiry was informed by at least one respondent with direct first-hand knowledge.

The participants included representatives of fact-checking organizations, journalism, the Press Council Nepal, civil society, the ECN, the Ministry of Information and Communication and election observation organizations. Two participants requested that their names and affiliations not be disclosed.

Interview questions were developed on the basis of the desk research and were tailored to the roles and practices of each respondent. Interviews were conducted in Nepali and were recorded with respondents’ consent. Recordings were transcribed and translated into English for analysis.

Interview data were analyzed thematically. Respondents were offered anonymity for their statements. Therefore, the report does not use direct attribution.

2.3.4 Limitations of the study

The findings of this study should be interpreted considering the following limitations.

First, the research is constrained by the limited transparency of social media platforms and political parties’ operations and decisions. Although the study triangulated evidence from documentary sources, key informant interviews and public communications, it was not possible to independently verify all claims made by these actors.

Second, while the twelve key informant interviews provided important insights from a range of stakeholders, they cannot fully represent all relevant perspectives involved in Nepal’s electoral information ecosystem.

Third, the study did not analyse misinformation therefore does not measure the overall volume, prevalence or characteristics of election-related information disorder.

However, the study provides an empirically grounded understanding of how key institutional and non-state actors responded to information disorder during Nepal’s 2026 election. Claims about the scale or prevalence of misinformation are therefore presented cautiously, particularly where they are based on interview accounts or self-reported organizational figures.

3. Context and Baseline

3.1 Nepal’s digital information ecosystem

Internet access in Nepal has expanded significantly over the past decade. According to the 2021 national census, 37.8 percent of households had internet access, while 52 percent of the population were identified as internet users (NSO, n.d.). More recent data shows broadband subscription penetration exceeded 146 percent, with the majority of Nepali internet users accessing the internet using mobile devices (NTA, 2026). Nepal was home to 14.8 million social media user identities in October 2025, equivalent to around half of the population (Kemp, 2025).

Social media has become an important channel for political communication, information dissemination and public engagement (Adhikari, 2026; “As campaigns go”, 2026). Facebook has remained an influential platform, while YouTube and TikTok have also emerged as important channels for political communication and audience outreach (Adhikari, 2026; “Facebook’s algorithmic”, 2026). The increasing use of short-form video and digital advertising have further demonstrated the expanding role of platforms in shaping public discourse and political participation in Nepal (Pathak & Prajapati, 2023).

Recent survey findings indicate that digital platforms have also become important sources of news. Acharya and Chapagain (2024) found that nearly half of internet users reported accessing news through mobile phones or computers, while Facebook and YouTube emerged as leading news platforms, particularly among younger and urban audiences. Among people aged 16–24, more than four-fifths relied on Facebook for news and more than half used YouTube, while reliance on television and radio was considerably lower (Acharya & Chapagain, 2024).

The significance of this is that voters increasingly encounter political information in environments where news, political campaigning, personal communication, and entertainment are mixed together. This creates opportunities for political actors to reach voters directly, but also creates conditions in which misleading information can circulate rapidly. While social media platforms have empowered millions of Nepalis with access to information, they have also become vehicles for misinformation (Gurung, 2025).

CMR-Nepal’s 2021 survey found that 92 percent of respondents had encountered misinformation online and 98 percent expressed concern about its effects on Nepali society and politics (CMR-Nepal, 2022). This indicates that concerns about misinformation predate the 2026 election and have become a part of the information environment.

3.2 Electoral institutions and response mechanisms

The Election Commission of Nepal is the principal institution responsible for administering elections and regulating electoral conduct. During election periods, its responsibilities extend to monitoring campaign practices and responding to violations of the election code of conduct. Other institutions, including the Nepal Police Cyber Bureau, Nepal Telecommunications Authority, Press Council Nepal and relevant government agencies, also have roles in responding to different forms of online content and communication.

The legal framework relevant to online misinformation consists of several instruments rather than a single comprehensive information-integrity framework.

The Electronic Transactions Act (ETA), 2006, predates the current platform-based information ecosystem. Article 47 prohibits publication or display of certain electronic materials, including content prohibited by prevailing law and material that may spread hate or jeopardize harmonious relations among communities. The provision has also been criticized for broad and ambiguous language and concerns about its implications for freedom of expression (Maharjan, 2024).

The National Criminal Penal Code, 2017 contains provisions that may apply to certain forms of online misinformation. Section 70 prohibits intentionally spreading rumours in circumstances specified by the Code. Section 295 prohibits taking, manipulating or publishing another person’s photograph without consent and could potentially be relevant to some forms of manipulated visual content. Section 306 prohibits certain forms of deceptive communication. However, these provisions were not designed specifically for contemporary platform-based information disorder, and their application to different forms of online misinformation has not been sufficiently tested through judicial interpretation.

The main gap therefore concerns institutional responsibility, speed of response, platform cooperation, transparency and the ability to distinguish harmful manipulation from legitimate political expression (“EC signs”, 2026; “Civil society groups”, 2026). Existing provisions operate across different institutions and were developed at different points in time. They do not provide a single framework governing the relationship between electoral authorities, platforms, political actors and civil society.

This understanding is important because efforts to address misinformation can themselves affect freedom of expression. Broad or ambiguous restrictions can create risks for legitimate political speech and journalism. The challenge is therefore to develop mechanisms that can respond to harmful information while maintaining clear definitions, proportionality and safeguards for legitimate political expression.

3.3 The 2022 election as a baseline

The 2022 general election provides an important baseline for assessing the changes that occurred by 2026.

The ECN’s 2020 Social Media Usage Policy identified information manipulation as an emerging electoral challenge and proposed policies, strategies and collaboration with technology companies. During the 2022 election, the ECN conducted orientation programs to strengthen election officials’ capacity on misinformation, incorporated provisions on misinformation and hate speech into the Election Code of Conduct and established monitoring arrangements involving the ECN, Nepal Police cyber bureau and the Nepali Army. It also conducted public awareness initiatives, including awareness messages disseminated through mobile ringtones in collaboration with telecommunications companies.

The ECN also sought to establish direct communication channels with major technology platforms, including Meta, TikTok, and Twitter (X since July 2023). Meta opened public access to political advertising through its Ad Library and conducted orientation to the ECN, political parties and journalists on election-integrity tools. These measures represented an important step, especially in the transparency of political advertising in Meta’s platforms. However, the effectiveness was constrained by the ECN’s technical capacity who did not monitor the advertising.

Research on the 2022 election found no evidence that misinformation significantly affected the election result or incited violence (Shrestha, 2022). But some level of coordination among electoral authorities, technology platforms, civil society and media was established.. The 2022 response showed that monitoring, public awareness and platform engagement strengthens the capacity to detect and respond to harmful information, but also that government-only or civil-society-only approaches were insufficient (NDI et al., 2023).

The 2026 election therefore provides an opportunity to assess not simply whether new interventions were introduced, but whether the weaknesses identified in 2022 were addressed. These included limited institutional coordination, insufficient technical infrastructure and skills, and uneven communication with platforms. The emergence of AI-generated content also altered the nature of the challenge.

3.4 Platform policies and approaches

Social media platforms are important actors in the electoral information environment because their policies and systems determine how political content is distributed, amplified, labelled, monetized, and removed. Major platforms have developed election-integrity programs that include political advertising transparency, content moderation, fact-checking partnerships, civic information initiatives, and coordination with election-management bodies (UNDP, 2024).

The European Commission’s 2022 Code of Practice on Disinformation provides one benchmark for platform accountability. Its signatories, including Meta, TikTok, and other major technology companies, committed to measures intended to reduce the creation, amplification, and monetization of disinformation. These include transparency in political advertising, action against coordinated manipulation and fake accounts, support for independent fact-checking, user reporting mechanisms, researcher access, and reporting on election-related interventions (European Commission, 2022).

However, platform implementation varies across countries. The election interventions in smaller markets can be constrained by limited local-language moderation, contextual expertise, and institutional engagement (Madung, 2024). In Nepal, platforms have limited local presence and relatively limited institutional engagement with stakeholders (Gurung, 2025). This reduces the ability of electoral authorities and civil society organizations to demand timely responses or transparency.

This study did not identify a publicly available Nepal-specific election-integrity policy from any platform. The analysis is based on global platform commitments, Nepal-specific public communications, and operational engagement during the election.

TikTok established a formal operational arrangement with the ECN before the election, including a dedicated mechanism for responding to requests (“EC signs”, 2026). Meta had no comparable formal operational agreement with the ECN during the 2026 election, although the ECN reported that it engaged with Meta and held a virtual meeting (“As campaigns go”, 2026). The difference between these arrangements became important in practice and is examined further in the Findings.

3.5 Civil society, media and fact-checking

Civil society organizations, fact-checking organizations, and media outlets are important components of response to information disorder. In Nepal, there was limited fact-checking, mainly by NepalFactCheck.org, TechPana FactCheck, Nepal Check, and fact-checking desks within media organisations such as Kantipur’s Factchecker, which participated in monitoring and verification during the 2026 election.

However, fact-checking has limitations. Evidence suggests that corrections can reduce belief in individual false claims, but their effects can be modest and corrections may not reach audiences that encountered the original misinformation (Walter et al., 2020). Fact-checking works best when integrated into a wider system of public communication, platform reporting, media engagement, and digital literacy.

The 2026 election saw some visible coordination among fact-checkers, media, and the ECN than in previous elections. NepalFactCheck expanded monitoring through provincial misinformation monitors and publication through collaboration with Online Khabar (“Collaboration between Onlinekhabar”, 2026), while TechPana FactCheck developed a public reporting mechanism and had a collaboration with ECN. Media organizations also increased attention to misinformation during the campaign period (“Checking disinformation”, 2026; “A flood of misleading”, 2026).

The reach of fact-checking remained a challenge. Interviewees pointed to gaps in local-language information and uneven access to corrective information. Interviewees also reported misinformation being circulated by people with higher levels of formal education, politicians, policymakers and media workers.

3.6 Political parties

Political parties are important actors in the electoral information environment because they have direct incentives to shape political narratives and has organized digital campaigning capacity. Research from South Asia suggests that parties use dedicated social media teams, networks of volunteers, and commercial influencers or contractors, while the distinction between legitimate digital campaigning and coordinated information manipulation can be difficult to establish from outside (Bradshaw & Howard, 2019).

The 2022 election provided evidence that Nepali political parties had established cyber teams and organized online networks to amplify partisan narratives. However, the scale and precise role of these networks in producing or countering misinformation remained difficult to establish.

The review conducted for this study did not identify publicly available policies from political parties governing election-related misinformation, coordinated digital activity, or political advertising. The report therefore distinguishes party policies or public commitments, where available, from the practices described by interviewees and observed through public monitoring.

The existence of coordinated digital campaigning does not in itself constitute misinformation. Political parties can legitimately use digital platforms to communicate, campaign and mobilize supporters. The concern arises where coordinated activity involves fabricated or misleading information, undisclosed political advertising, impersonation or other practices that undermine transparency and electoral integrity.

4. Findings

The 2026 election showed that election-related information disorder had become an established feature of the electoral information environment. The study did not measure the volume or prevalence of misinformation and the findings below draw on documentary evidence, monitoring of public interventions, and accounts from key informants across electoral institutions, government, civil society, journalism, and fact-checking.

The evidence points to a more complex information environment than in previous elections, particularly because of AI-generated material, manipulated media, coordinated digital activity, and role of social media platforms.

4.1 Nature and forms of electoral misinformation

A range of misleading and manipulated content circulated during the election period (“Checking disinformation”, 2026; Adhikari, 2026; Bhatta, 2026).

One recurring form was recycled footage presented as current election-day events (“Police debunk viral”, 2026; “Claim that the”, 2026). A journalist respondent described encountering old military training videos presented as evidence of armed clashes in Okhaldhunga, Dhading, and other districts. He said some mainstream media outlets also used those footage.

False endorsements and withdrawal claims were another form of misinformation. False reports claimed that prominent candidates had switched parties or withdrawn their candidacies; fake endorsements attributed to prominent figures, including Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, were circulated (“Man arrested for”, 2026; “Fragments of Prachanda’s”, 2026). Respondents said large amounts of misinformation about prominent candidates supporting rival parties circulated in the final stages of the campaign.

AI-generated content and deepfakes posed a new challenge (Adhikari, 2026; Bhatta, 2026; Ojha, 2026; Satyal, 2026). Respondents recalled AI-generated audio and video, including deepfake audio attributed to Modi while fact-checkers reported difficulty verifying those content because detection tools did not always provide conclusive results. In one case, a tool reportedly assessed the audio as highly likely to be a deepfake but found no evidence that the associated video had been manipulated. Verification therefore required locating the original material which increased workload to the fact-checkers.

The Press Council Nepal also identified AI-generated content and deepfakes as a major challenge because monitoring bodies increasingly faced difficulty distinguishing manipulated material from authentic content (Bhatta, 2026; Satyal, 2026). The ECN similarly recognized the need to develop capacity at a pace matching to the rapid development of AI technologies.

Another category of misinformation involved manipulated photographs and visuals targeting candidates (Adhikari, 2026; Bhatta, 2026). Edited photographs showing political figures such as Rabi Lamichhane and Balen Shah with cash and alcohol circulated widely; a false story about Gagan Thapa allegedly distributing cash from a helicopter was also reported.

These cases are categorized as disinformation because they involved fabricated or manipulated representations of events or people.

However, other political content was different. There were also contents attacking candidates for alleged corruption, past scandals or personal conduct. Those contents were partisan, provocative, or misleading. Political criticism and one-sided campaign communication have long existed outside digital platforms, and have now found new amplification in the digital platforms. This study did not look at whether political content is favourable or hostile to a candidate, and only focused on whether it involves false or manipulated claims, coordination, impersonation, or other practices that undermine the integrity of electoral information.

The evidence also points to the role of diaspora communication. Interviewees described Nepalis living abroad communicating political content to family members in Nepal through phone calls and messaging applications. Such interpersonal communication is not always misinformation, but it could be largely based on the contents that were being circulated on digital platforms. It shows how political information can spread through different networks and reach voters through channels other than mainstream media and public digital platforms.

4.2 Platform responses and accountability

TikTok and Facebook/Meta were identified by interviewees as important platforms in the election-related information environment. During the 2026 electoral cycle, the ECN’s experience with TikTok and Meta differed substantially.

TikTok signed a formal agreement with the ECN before the election, establishing an operational mechanism for responding to requests concerning problematic content (“EC signs”, 2026). According to the ECN, TikTok removed 42 percent of content reported by it, and Meta removed 23 percent. These figures are based on ECN’s reporting and were not independently verified by the study.

The Election Observation Committee Nepal reported that TikTok publicly disclosed having removed more than one million problematic content in Nepal during the election period. This does not measure the prevalence of misinformation however is indicative of the volume.

Several interviewees nevertheless described TikTok as more responsive than other platforms. The existence of TikTok’s dedicated unit made the process of reporting and removing problematic content easier. Journalists reported that TikTok was responding quickly and referred to its cooperation with the ECN.

The evidence also shows an important distinction between platform responsiveness and platform effectiveness. TikTok could respond relatively quickly to reported content while remaining a major channel through which problematic material reached users. According to a respondent, TikTok content had substantial reach, particularly among rural audiences. Faster removal, therefore, did not eliminate the wider information-disorder problem.

Meta presented a different picture. Interviewees described limited institutional responsiveness during the election. There was no operational agreement with the ECN, and several respondents said that Meta did not provide timely responses to institutional outreach. This mattered because Facebook remained an important platform for politically active users, including journalists, party workers, and civil servants.

The absence of a direct operational channel also complicated efforts to identify operators of anonymous pages. Interviewees reported difficulties determining who controlled Facebook pages spreading false information. This created challenges for both fact-checking and legal accountability because requests for action had to pass through platform mechanisms that were perceived as slow or difficult to access.

The difference between TikTok and Meta points to a platform-accountability problem. Voluntary cooperation can create practical channels for responding to harmful content, but the effectiveness of such arrangements depends on the willingness and capacity of individual platforms to engage. Where a platform does not provide comparable operational cooperation, electoral authorities and civil society have limited leverage.

Content removed once reported by the ECN

TikTok42%
Meta / Facebook23%

Source: Election Commission of Nepal, self-reported figures not independently verified by this study.

4.3 Coordinated digital activity and information operations

A significant portion of misleading content appeared to be opportunistic, circulated by individuals without verification, or because it appealed to existing political biases. At the same time, interviewees described coordinated digital activity involving organized networks and party-affiliated teams (Dahal, 2026; “Facebook’s algorithmic”, 2026).

A journalist described monitoring between 50 and 60 coordinated “starter Facebook pages” that appeared to operate simultaneously and distribute similar content across multiple pages. According to his account, some pages had existed before the election, changed names during the election, and were subsequently repurposed.

Interviewees also described paid social media handlers and coordinated engagement. A civil society respondent reported an example involving an IT professional who worked as a social media handler for a candidate. According to the account, the team used large numbers of coordinated comments to increase engagement with the candidate’s posts and potentially influence platform algorithms.

Such activity is not necessarily misinformation. Coordinated amplification of legitimate campaign content is different from the production or dissemination of false information. However, it becomes relevant to the information-integrity debate when coordinated networks are used to amplify manipulated information or obscure the source of political content.

Another interviewee described a commercial campaign operation in which a party reportedly paid approximately NPR 3.5 million for a team to conduct field research and distribute favourable content about candidates and leave out negative information. The respondent explicitly described this as organized, one-sided content distribution rather than false information.

This finding suggests that some digital practices identified during the election belong more accurately to the field of political communication and coordinated campaigning than to misinformation. It also shows that information integrity cannot be assessed only by examining individual false claims. Transparency about who produces, pays for, and amplifies political content is also relevant to the electoral information environment.

The Ministry of Information and Communication also reported politically affiliated cyber-literate activists and party cadres circulating misleading information. However, the evidence does not establish that political parties were the primary source of misinformation or that all party-affiliated digital activity involved information manipulation. The findings instead indicate that political parties had significant digital capacity and incentives to shape political narratives, but oversight of these activities remained very limited.

4.4 State responses: capacity, coordination and limitations

The ECN deployed the most substantial institutional response among the actors. The establishment of the Election Information Dissemination and Coordination Centre (EIDC) represented an expansion of the media monitoring mechanism used during the 2022 election.

The EIDC was designed to support a clean, credible, and participatory electoral process. It consisted of three units: the Information Ethics Promotion Unit, the Press Office, and the Electronic Voter Education Unit. The Press Office monitored traditional and online media compliance with the election code of conduct, while the Electronic Voter Education Unit disseminated official election information through ECN digital channels. The Information Ethics Promotion Unit was responsible for addressing misinformation and hate speech online.

The Information Ethics Promotion Unit brought together representatives from the Ministry of Information and Communication, Nepal Police Cyber Bureau, Nepali Army Cyber Security Directorate, Nepal Telecommunications Authority, Press Council Nepal, and the ECN.

According to the ECN, the unit was mandated to monitor and analyse election-related content on social media, conduct fact-checking of suspicious information, investigate complaints, monitor candidates and influential users, recommend action against violations, monitor online campaign expenditure, and track emerging trends in the digital information environment.

The ECN reported using open-source intelligence techniques, Google Alerts, Google Dork Search, Talkwalker and UNDP’s eMonitor+ system. Information was collected and analysed across major platforms including Facebook, X, YouTube, Instagram and TikTok.

The legal framework for these interventions was anchored in the Election Commission Act, 2017 and the Election Code of Conduct, 2026. The Code prohibited dissemination of misinformation and misleading content that could affect candidates, political parties, voters, or the electoral process. It also prohibited personal attacks, character assassination, abusive content, and hate speech based on race, religion, language, gender, or region.

The ECN also established fact-checking arrangements and partnered with TechPana FactCheck and media organizations. It engaged with social media platforms on content moderation and voter education. According to the ECN, it signed an MoU with TikTok, while less progress was achieved with Meta. The ECN reported that TikTok removed 42 percent of content reported by the Commission and Meta removed 23 percent.

The ECN reported that the Information Ethics Promotion Unit analysed 998 potentially harmful pieces of content during the election period, most of which originated from social media platforms.

These institutional developments represent progress from the 2022 election. However, the evidence suggests that the development of institutional mechanisms did not fully resolve the capacity and coordination problems identified earlier.

A civil society respondent described a gap between reported violations and enforcement action. His organization’s monitoring team, which included two dedicated IT staff, tracked approximately 12,800 pieces of content and identified 882 violations of the election code of conduct, including content produced by civil servants and security personnel soliciting votes on social media. He argued that identifying violations and securing remedies were separate problems because effective action often depended on platform cooperation.

This points to the response-speed problem. Misinformation can spread rapidly, while institutional responses require verification, coordination and communication. The delay between identifying a problematic claim and securing a correction or removal can therefore allow content to reach a large audience before an intervention occurs.

The evidence also suggests that the visibility and responsiveness of the ECN’s digital interventions were stronger at the centre than at the constituency level. A journalist respondent described the ECN as more active in Kathmandu and said that similar activity was difficult to observe at the district level. The study did not independently measure differences in response rates across geographic areas. However, the interview evidence indicates a gap between central monitoring capacity and local-level communication and correction.

The Nepal Police Cyber Bureau operated an IT cell across all 77 districts and reportedly removed 471 pieces of content during the electoral silence period. Interviewees said that much of the removed content was from TikTok, but fewer Facebook posts were taken down because the bureau lacked direct access to the platform.

The involvement of security institutions also raises a rights-based concern. A civil society representative said that District Administration Offices could sometimes become overactive in regulating online content, and this creates a risk that legitimate political speech could be treated as misinformation. This reinforces the importance of clear institutional mandates, proportionality, and safeguards for freedom of expression.

The Ministry of Information and Communication played a coordinating role through a Quick Response Coordination Cell involving the Cyber Bureau, NTA, Press Council Nepal, Advertising Board, Nepal Telecom, and other stakeholders. Its role focused on liaising with Nepal-basd contact officers of media, broadcasting, and social media companies to support compliance with the election code of conduct.

The different institutional arrangements were therefore complementary. TikTok’s operational arrangement with the ECN provided a mechanism for content reporting and removal, while the Ministry’s coordination mechanism involved broader compliance with the election code. However, the evidence suggests that coordination did not eliminate the gap between the speed of information circulation and the speed of institutional verification and response.

4.5 Civil society and fact-checking: contribution and limitations

Civil society organizations, fact-checkers and media organizations played a more visible and coordinated role during the 2026 election than in previous elections.

The ECN reported working with fact-checking organizations to verify claims. An official described the linkage between the EIDC and fact-checkers as an improvement in the institutional response.

TechPana developed a public mechanism through which users could flag suspicious content by tagging the organization in their comments. TechPana reported approximately 10,000 content tags within two weeks and around 20,000 over the election period. Individual posts sometimes attracted several hundred flags. TechPana prioritized content considered most likely to influence electoral decision-making and systematically reviewed more than 100 pieces of identified misinformation during the month preceding the election. The numbers indicate the scale of demand placed on fact-checking organizations during the election.

NepalFactCheck.org expanded monitoring through provincial misinformation monitors in all seven provinces. It also signed a memorandum of understanding with the news website Online Khabar to co-publish fact-checks. The organization reported recording more than 1,000 potential misinformation incidents, fact-checking 79 potentially harmful items, and publishing 29 of those through Online Khabar in the month preceding election day.

Fact-checking played an important role in identifying and correcting misleading information. However, interviewees consistently reported that fact-checking could not always keep pace with the speed at which misleading content spread.

One respondent described a gap between fact-checking organizations and audiences in remote areas, particularly where people received information through social media or interpersonal communication and where corrective information was not available in the same local languages. These observations indicate a problem of access to corrective information rather than evidence that rural or less-educated populations are inherently more vulnerable to misinformation.

Misinformation was also reported among people with formal education. A civil society representative observed that people from a range of educational and professional backgrounds, including politicians, policymakers, and media workers, also circulated misinformation through digital platforms.

The findings therefore support an understanding of digital literacy. The problem is not simply whether people are educated or whether they live in urban or rural areas. It also concerns the ability to identify sources, assess context, recognize manipulated content, and access credible information quickly.

Accountability Lab’s community-level model sought to address this problem by mobilizing young people to monitor and report local content violations and facilitating local stakeholder dialogue. This approach represented an attempt to strengthen local capacity rather than relying entirely on centralized fact-checking.

The Press Council Nepal monitored compliance with journalistic and election codes of conduct (“Press Council registers”, 2026; “Press Council Nepal”, 2026). However, its jurisdiction did not fully cover unregistered online portals and individual social media accounts. Interviewees also reported fake pages that mimicked established media organizations, including pages using the names and visual identities of trusted outlets.

The Federation of Nepali Journalists conducted training on responsible digital media use, including guidance for journalists concerning their personal social-media accounts during the campaign period. However, interviewees reported that journalists and other educated actors also circulated misleading information through their personal accounts.

These findings reinforce the limits of a purely reactive fact-checking model. Fact-checking can correct specific claims, but it cannot by itself address the conditions under which misleading narratives are produced, amplified, and trusted.

4.6 Political parties’ digital strategies and oversight

Political parties emerged in the interviews as an important and comparatively underexamined actor in Nepal’s electoral information environment. Several interviewees described parties as having increasingly organized digital operations, including youth-based cyber teams and coordinated engagement networks.

A civil society representative described new political parties as having structured teams capable of generating large numbers of coordinated positive comments immediately after a post was published. According to his account, these teams sought to use platform algorithms strategically to increase visibility and engagement.

This type of coordinated engagement is not itself misinformation. It is part of political campaigning and political communication. It becomes an information-integrity concern where coordinated networks are used to manipulate visibility, conceal the source of content, or amplify false or manipulated claims.

A journalist respondent also described political advertising accounts that did not publicly identify their sponsors. According to him, both pro-party and anti-opposition content was boosted through accounts whose political affiliation was not transparent.

This raises a more direct electoral-integrity concern because voters may not know who paid for or sponsored political content. It also creates difficulties for monitoring campaign expenditure and identifying responsibility for misleading advertising.

The study found no specific mechanism within the ECN’s institutional response that was dedicated to monitoring party-affiliated cyber teams, digital advertising expenditure, or the sources of paid political content. The election code addressed campaign expenditure and certain forms of speech, but the digital operations described by interviewees were not subject to a clearly defined monitoring mechanism.

The absence of a dedicated mechanism does not establish that political parties were the primary source of misinformation. It does, however, indicate that an increasingly important part of electoral campaigning operated with limited transparency.

One possible response identified by interviewees was the registration of official social-media accounts of parties and candidates with the ECN. The purpose of such registration would not simply be to make accounts public, since many official accounts are already publicly accessible. Rather, registration could establish an authoritative list of official accounts, help distinguish official communication from impersonation, facilitate monitoring, and create a clearer point of accountability for campaign communication.

If such a system requires changes to electoral law or regulations, the necessary legal basis would need to be established before implementation.

The finding is that political parties have developed digital campaign capacity faster than the mechanisms available to monitor and regulate that capacity. However, this is a gap in electoral governance rather than evidence that all party digital activity is misinformation.

5. Gaps in Combating Electoral Misinformation

5.1 The response-speed gap

The most consistent finding across the interviews was the gap between how quickly misleading information spreads and how quickly institutions can respond.

The response to a misleading claim usually requires identification, verification, coordination, communication with relevant actors and, in some cases, platform action. These steps can take hours, while content can reach large audiences within minutes.

The problem is therefore partly a resource issue but also an institutional design issue. Even when monitoring systems identify problematic content, effective intervention may depend on other institutions or platforms. This creates delays between detection and remedy.

The 2026 experience shows that strengthening monitoring alone is insufficient. Response mechanisms must also be designed around the speed and structure of digital platforms.

5.2 The institutional coordination and capacity gap

Nepal has developed the foundations of a whole-of-society response involving the ECN, government agencies, law enforcement, civil society, media, fact-checkers, and social media platforms.

The EIDC represents progress in this direction. The Ministry’s Quick Response Coordination Cell and the engagement of the Cyber Bureau, NTA and Press Council also show an effort to coordinate different institutional responsibilities.

However, the institutions continue to operate with different mandates, capacities and access to platforms. The absence of clearly defined responsibilities can make it difficult to determine who should respond to particular forms of information disorder and how quickly.

The evidence therefore suggests that the main institutional challenge is not the complete absence of mechanisms, but their fragmentation and uneven capacity.

5.3 The platform-accountability gap

Platform accountability remains one of the weakest parts of Nepal’s response.

TikTok’s cooperation with the ECN showed that voluntary engagement can create operational benefits. The establishment of an operational mechanism allowed faster communication and, according to the ECN, produced higher removal rates than Meta.

However, this arrangement remained dependent on voluntary cooperation. Meta’s limited engagement during the same election demonstrated the consequences of having no comparable mechanism.

The contrast is particularly important because Meta had engaged with the ECN during the 2022 election. The experience therefore demonstrates that platform engagement can change across electoral cycles and cannot be treated as a stable institutional arrangement.

Nepal’s limited leverage over global platforms is partly related to the fact that platform decision-making and corporate headquarters are located outside the country. This creates a structural accountability problem for a smaller market.

The study therefore supports the development of clearer platform-accountability mechanisms, but such mechanisms should be designed with safeguards for freedom of expression and should focus on transparency, cooperation, due process, and accountability rather than broad content restrictions.

5.4 The political-party oversight gap

Political parties have become increasingly capable digital actors, but the electoral oversight framework has not developed at the same pace.

The findings indicate the presence of organized digital teams, coordinated engagement, and opaque political advertising. These practices are not necessarily misinformation. However, they can affect the visibility and circulation of political information and can make it difficult to identify who is responsible for political content.

The lack of a clear mechanism for registering official accounts, monitoring digital campaign expenditure, and identifying political advertisers creates a transparency gap.

Future electoral governance should therefore distinguish between legitimate political campaigning and practices that obscure sponsorship, impersonate candidates or institutions, or involve misleading and manipulated information.

5.5 Digital and media literacy as a force multiplier

The findings indicate that limited access to source verification, fact-checking, and corrective information can increase the impact of misinformation.

However, the report does not establish that a majority of Nepalis cannot distinguish misinformation or that misinformation is primarily a rural or low-literacy problem. Interview evidence indicates that misinformation also circulates among educated people, politicians, policymakers, and media workers.

The more defensible finding is that digital and media literacy can strengthen resilience across different groups. Voters need the ability to assess sources, recognize manipulated content, identify context, and distinguish official information from political claims.

The ECN reportedly spent NPR 250 million on voter education during the election cycle. One interviewee questioned whether some of this investment could have had greater long-term impact if used throughout the year to produce accessible digital content and build sustained public awareness.

The implication is that digital literacy should not be treated solely as an election-period activity. It should become part of continuous public education.

5.6 AI and emerging technology

AI-generated content emerged as an important new challenge during the 2026 election.

Interviewees identified deepfake audio, manipulated photographs, and AI-generated content as difficult to verify. The challenge is particularly acute because conventional fact-checking methods may not be sufficient to determine whether audiovisual content has been generated or manipulated.

The evidence does not allow the study to quantify the volume of AI-generated misinformation. However, interviewees consistently described AI as a growing challenge and argued that institutional capacity must develop alongside the technology.

The 2026 experience therefore points to the need for dedicated technical expertise, clearer procedures for verifying suspected AI-generated content, and stronger cooperation among electoral institutions, fact-checkers, and platforms.

5.7 Gendered dimensions

Gendered dimensions of information disorder received less attention than other issues, but were identified by interviewees as an emerging concern.

A respondent said women candidates and women in political roles were targeted by fabricated visual content intended to damage their personal and professional reputations. The respondent argued that fake photographs and fabricated associations could affect women’s political participation by reinforcing existing social discrimination and stereotypes. The issue deserves greater attention in future election monitoring and platform responses.

6. Conclusion

The 2026 House of Representatives election shows that election-related information disorder has become a fixture of Nepal’s electoral landscape. The election took place at a time when social media platforms had become central to political communication, and misleading and manipulated information circulated through multiple channels.

The study does not establish the overall volume of misinformation or demonstrate that misinformation determined electoral outcomes. It does, however, show that the information environment has become more complex. Recycled footage, fabricated endorsements, manipulated photographs, misleading political claims, coordinated digital activity, and AI-generated content created challenges for electoral authorities, platforms, fact-checkers, media, and civil society.

Nepal’s institutional response also developed between the 2022 and 2026 elections. The establishment of the EIDC, greater coordination among institutions, stronger links with fact-checkers, and operational engagement with TikTok demonstrate progress. Civil society organizations, fact-checkers, and media organizations also expanded their monitoring and verification activities.

However, the findings show that institutional development has not kept pace with the speed and complexity of digital information manipulation. The gaps were not simply a lack of interventions. They included limited technical capacity, uneven implementation, fragmented coordination, weak platform accountability, limited oversight of political parties’ digital operations, and insufficient preparedness for AI-generated content.

The contrasting experiences of the ECN with TikTok and Meta illustrate the problem. TikTok’s formal operational cooperation with the ECN created a direct mechanism for reporting and responding to problematic content. Meta’s more limited engagement created a different set of challenges, despite the platform’s important role in Nepal’s information environment. The experience shows that voluntary cooperation can improve responses, but cannot provide a consistent accountability system on its own.

Civil society and fact-checking organizations also played an important role, but their interventions remained largely reactive. Fact-checking can correct individual claims, but it cannot by itself address the wider political, technological, and social conditions through which misleading narratives circulate. The findings therefore support a broader approach that includes sustained digital and media literacy, institutional capacity, local communication, and stronger coordination.

Political parties also emerged as an important and comparatively underexamined actor. The evidence does not establish that political parties were the primary source of misinformation. It does show that parties and affiliated actors had increasingly organized digital campaign capacity, including coordinated engagement and political advertising practices that were not always transparent. This creates an important gap in electoral oversight.

Overall, Nepal has begun to establish the foundations of a whole-of-society response to election-related information disorder. Electoral authorities, government agencies, platforms, civil society, media, and fact-checkers have all developed mechanisms for responding to the problem. However, these mechanisms remain fragmented, unevenly resourced, and, in important areas, dependent on voluntary cooperation.

The experience of the 2026 election therefore suggests that Nepal needs to move from largely election-period responses toward a more continuous system of information integrity. Such a system should combine stronger institutional capacity, clearer responsibilities, meaningful engagement with platforms, greater transparency in political digital campaigning, sustained digital and media literacy, stronger fact-checking networks, and safeguards for freedom of expression.

The objective should not be to eliminate political disagreement or partisan communication. It should be to ensure that voters can participate in elections in an information environment where misleading and manipulated content can be identified and addressed while legitimate political expression remains protected.

7. Recommendations

The findings show that no single intervention can adequately address election-related information disorder. Nepal requires a coordinated, rights-based, and long-term approach involving electoral authorities, government institutions, technology platforms, political parties, civil society, media, and research institutions.

7.1 Election Commission of Nepal

  1. Institutionalize the Election Information Dissemination and Coordination Centre as a permanent institutional mechanism. The EIDC should not operate only during election periods. A permanent mechanism would allow the ECN to retain technical expertise, institutional memory, relationships with platforms, and coordination mechanisms between elections.

  2. Develop clear procedures for identifying, verifying and responding to election-related information disorder. The ECN should establish clear procedures defining how complaints are received, verified, categorized, referred, and resolved. The procedures should also distinguish misinformation from legitimate political criticism and campaigning.

  3. Explore a system for registering official social-media accounts of political parties and candidates. The purpose of registration would not simply be to make accounts public. It would establish an authoritative list of official accounts, facilitate monitoring, help distinguish official communication from impersonation, and provide a clearer point of accountability for campaign communication. If implementation requires amendments to electoral law or regulations, the ECN and government should establish the necessary legal basis before introducing such a system.

  4. Strengthen digital monitoring and communication capacity at provincial and district levels. Expanding digital monitoring beyond Kathmandu should involve more than identifying problematic posts. Provincial and district-level mechanisms should be able to identify locally circulating misinformation, communicate verified information, receive complaints, and refer cases to the central response mechanism.

  5. Integrate digital and media literacy into voter education. Voter education should include source verification, identifying manipulated content, recognizing impersonation, and understanding how political content and advertising circulate on social media. These activities should not be limited to the election period. Continuous public education would allow voters to develop these skills before campaigns begin.

7.2 Government and other state institutions

  1. Develop a clear legal framework for platform accountability. The framework should set out requirements for transparency, cooperation with electoral authorities, reporting mechanisms, and access to appropriate channels for addressing harmful content. Any such framework should avoid broad or vague provisions that could be used to suppress legitimate political speech. It should include clear definitions, proportionality, and safeguards for freedom of expression.

  2. Clarify institutional mandates. The responsibilities of the ECN, Cyber Bureau, NTA, Press Council Nepal, Ministry of Information and Communication, and other relevant institutions should be clearly defined for different forms of online information disorder. The objective should be to reduce duplication and ensure that complaints can move quickly from detection to verification and remedy.

  3. Strengthen coordination with platforms before elections. Formal engagement mechanisms should be established well before the campaign period rather than being developed only after misinformation begins circulating. Such mechanisms should include clear contact points, response procedures, and escalation channels.

7.3 Political parties and candidates

  1. Political parties should adopt and publish internal digital campaigning guidelines. These guidelines should address the use of official accounts, political advertising, coordinated digital activity, impersonation, and the circulation of misleading information by party officials, candidates, and affiliated campaign teams.

  2. Political parties and candidates should make political advertising more transparent. Where platforms provide advertising libraries or sponsorship information, parties and candidates should use identifiable accounts and disclose the source of paid political content.

  3. Parties should establish internal mechanisms for correcting misleading information. Where false information is circulated by official party accounts or affiliated campaign actors, parties should have procedures for correction and clarification.

  4. Parties should distinguish legitimate political criticism from misleading or manipulated content. Political disagreement and criticism are part of democratic campaigning. Internal guidelines should therefore focus on fabricated claims, manipulated media, impersonation, and deceptive practices rather than attempting to restrict legitimate political expression.

7.4 Social media platforms

  1. Establish institutional contact points for Nepal. Major technology companies should maintain clear channels through which the ECN, fact-checkers, and civil society organizations can report election-related information disorder and obtain timely responses.

  2. Apply election-integrity commitments consistently in smaller democracies. Platform policies should not depend solely on the size of a market. Election-related interventions should include appropriate local-language moderation, contextual expertise, and engagement with domestic electoral institutions.

  3. Strengthen local-language moderation capacity. Platforms should develop greater capacity to identify and assess misleading and manipulated content in Nepali and relevant local languages.

  4. Publish Nepal-specific transparency information during elections. Platforms should provide, where feasible, information on election-related content moderation, takedown requests, responses to government and civil society requests, and political advertising.

  5. Maintain clear procedures for responding to election authorities. The experience of dealing with TikTok and Meta demonstrates the importance of operational access. Platforms should establish procedures before elections for receiving, verifying and responding to requests from electoral authorities.

7.5 Media and fact-checking organizations

  1. Strengthen collaboration among fact-checking organizations. Fact-checkers should explore shared reporting mechanisms, coordination on high-impact claims and mechanisms for referring cases that require specialized technical verification.

  2. Develop stronger capacity to verify AI-generated content. Fact-checking organizations should strengthen technical capacity to assess deepfake audio, manipulated photographs, and AI-generated video.

  3. Integrate fact-checking into regular reporting. Media organizations should continue to integrate verification into election coverage rather than treating fact-checking as a separate activity that begins only after misinformation goes viral.

  4. Improve the reach of corrective information. Fact-checking organizations and media should consider how corrections can reach the same audiences and channels through which misleading content originally circulated.

7.6 Civil society organizations

  1. Expand long-term digital and media literacy programs. Digital literacy should be treated as a continuous public education issue rather than an intervention limited to election periods.

  2. Develop materials in local languages. Civil society organizations should produce accessible materials that explain source verification, manipulated content, and misinformation in languages used by different communities.

  3. Strengthen community-level monitoring. Community-based approaches can complement centralized monitoring by identifying locally circulating narratives and providing channels for early intervention.

7.7 Research and academic institutions

  1. Move beyond documenting individual misinformation claims. Future research should examine narratives, networks, coordinated digital practices, political advertising, and the institutional conditions that enable information disorder.

  2. Develop comparative evidence from different elections. Research comparing the 2022 and 2026 elections should examine changes in platform behaviour, institutional capacity, political-party digital campaigning, AI-generated content, and public responses.

  3. Develop stronger evidence on the reach and effects of misinformation. Future studies should consider systematic content analysis, audience research, and where possible comparative measures of exposure, correction, and behavioural effects.

  4. The 2026 experience shows that responding to election-related misinformation cannot depend solely on fact-checking, content removal, or legal enforcement. Effective responses require continued collaboration among electoral authorities, government institutions, social media platforms, political parties, media, civil society, and research institutions.

  5. The long-term objective should be to strengthen institutional trust, improve digital and media literacy, increase platform accountability, improve transparency in political digital campaigning, and build societal resilience while protecting legitimate political expression.

The 2026 experience shows that responding to election-related misinformation cannot depend solely on fact-checking, content removal or legal enforcement. Effective responses require continued collaboration among electoral authorities, government institutions, platforms, political parties, media, civil society and research institutions.

The long-term objective should be to strengthen institutional trust, improve digital and media literacy, increase platform accountability, improve transparency in political digital campaigning and build societal resilience while protecting legitimate political expression.

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Cite this report

Acharya, U., Pathak, T., Bhusal, T., & Kunwar, R. (2026). Responding to Electoral Misinformation: Policy Approaches and Practices During the 2026 Nepal Election. Center for Media Research - Nepal.

ISBN
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Publisher
Center for Media Research - Nepal
Published
August 2026
Design
Abritti Media (online) | Ram Krishna Rana (print)

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